Shinsekai yori Episode 21 Discussion

Tyrel said:
Some people say because the "Fiend" aka the child of Mamoru and Maria, which is actually a human was raised by queerats, then he believes that they're not the "Demons." In his eyes he sees all the humans as Demons and thus Death feedback doesn't work.

However, the thing about this logic is that we were told other people killed humans, thinking they were queerats in the field, they themselves died because they didn't know who they were attacking since it was too dark. So the logic behind what I just said before this doesn't make sense. Maybe the only way to kill someone is by Cantus leakage.

Nequam said:
* There must be an entity capable of being aware of itself, and of others
* If there is no entity that is capable of being aware of others, then there is ultimately no possible attributable ethical system that can exist, given that nature of ethical systems demands some existentially shared nature between any given bodies of entities
* If there is no entity that is capable of being aware of itself, then there is ultimately no acclaimation of responsibility for any given entity for which it cannot distinguish any sets of elements between itself and others, by which all accounts it fails to even rationalize an agency of effect of itself
* There must be to some extent a freedom in which the agent can be acclaimed some or all responsibility for its actions
* An agent who is not acting in accordance to its agency cannot be attributed to any causes of action, and as such, ought to be withdrawed from all possible judgement
* There must be some value system for which certain things are favoured over others
* If there is nothing valued, then everything is equally neutral in its state of action, and as such there is no proposable state of difference to which we can claim that an individual has acted within its rights, or outside of its rights
* The system is usually based on principles in which in general yield favourable consequences with respect to the value being upheld
* The magnitude of the favourability of a particular value varies for any given individual with respect to both time, and other individuals; as such is affected by the nature and amount of experiences and predispositions

We note that for any given value, its inherent worth can be expressed as the sum of perceived future positive consequence, for an arbitary reason, given some amount of experience to which the value is invoked, and the predispositions by which the entity adhere to in the sense that the experience itself can be considered positive in nature, by its own nature
The value itself is generally itself a source of positive outcomes based on some abstractions
For any given value, it is traceable to some extent to some arbitrary criterion for which has absolutely no relevance with the exception to those who are capable of possessing those values, that is, for any and all given values have ultimately no worth in themself outside of a given entity, by which such formulations of values are possible in the first place
Loyalty, honesty, revenge, trust,etc are all infinitely meaningless to the universe itself, if humans all ceased to exist, and the agents by which such formulations could exist in essence, and of which all above any other entities greater in existence to humans do not exist either, and of those of such potential to make some formulations, then for any arbitrary value, its inherent value is nil
Relative to the universe, nothing can be said of squealer or any of the actions of the villagers.

We denote that for any temporal existence will desire in its uttermost rationale, in principle, withholding the concern of all others to want to continue to exist. In succession, we also assume that for any given existence, it will desire to act in ways to which it can be most capable of doing so, that is, it wills to act in its potential and capacity of possibilities. A limitation in the possibilities that can be brought about, by an imposed system or collection of individuals is undesirable, unless in other circumstance it subscribes to a value that is highest in magnitude to all others, or such that any other given value is incomparable to the worth in being restricted.

Squealer in his capacity has some arbitrary desire. We may call it a need for power, or domination, or social status. Regardless, in its equivalency, it is some manifest of social meaning. If all entities except Squealer disappeared, there would be in essence almost no reason for Squealer to do anything. And so we denote some conflict that exists in nature with regards to Squealer's values and the human values.

Any entity in its right might wish to limit the agency of other individuals, in the ensurance of its continuing existence. Humans have some propensity for action, that is, the sum of sets of possible actions is greater than any conceivable Squealer existence. Ultimately, we denote some collective identity to any given set of members of individuals with some magnitude or size k of actions and properties. Squealer benefits greatly from controlling humans to do his bidding, in the same way that humans benefit greatly from the labour of others. In practicality, we can surmise some universal system in which the imposition of limits are minimized based on some communal values.

However, this is often not the case in reality, as it is almost inevitable for any given large size or group of collective of individuals to be in conflict simply because of scarcity, or the lack of possible ensurances of continuing existences in an environment that permits maximized freedoms to perform any set of actions where distributing a freedom to some individual means relegating such a given freedom to other individuals.

And so, there is little to say on the actions of any given individual, in which we denote that the system itself is predispositional to a reversion in state to its infantile nature, given any collection of entities, with the ascribed natures, for a finite capacity-based freedom system.

In a perfect, infinite freedom capacity system, one would imagine a universe in which for any given entity, such an entity is capable of altering any and all possible rules for which its nature is itself ascribed to, in the sense that the limitations of possible outcomes are reduced to 0, and the maximal existential value or worth in action is infinitesimal. That is, unlimited power to each and every individual, or in its equivalency absoluteness in definitive power.

As such all ethical systems are imperfect by their ineptitude to equalize a set of values in magnitude, and are hindered by the impositions of limitations with respect to any given group in which for some given value, another group will benefit from either the reduction of value-based consequences of a given group or an augmentative advantage of such a group in its freedom-excerising aptitude that causes disequlibrative proportions of freedom with respect to other groups, and so to the extent at which one deems fair, ethical systems successfully approximate a state in which to minimize the proportions of differing freedom capacities in varying circumstances that would otherwise trigger potential conflicts.